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Liberalization and Welfare Conditions of a Developing Country: A 
General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper attempts to analyze the impact of trade liberalization policy, in terms of FDI, 
on the level of informal competitive wage rate as well as on the size of the informal 
sectors of a developing economy with dualistic economic structure in a general 
equilibrium framework. The wage rate earned by the informal workers has been 
considered here as a proxy for their living standard. In this paper it is found that FDI 
raises the level of wage rate of the informal workers and consequently raises their 
standard of living. It is also found in this paper that FDI expands both formal and 
informal manufacturing sectors in the urban areas whereas it contracts the rural 
agricultural informal sector. In this structure an attempt has also been made to analyze the 
effects on the welfare level of the economy for a drive towards liberalization through FDI 
by assuming Sen (1974) type social welfare function which considers inequality in 
income distribution. 
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Liberalization and Welfare Conditions of a Developing Country: A 
General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
1. Introduction:              
                   The developing economies are characterized by dualistic structures in the 
form of a highly formalized organized sector along with an unorganized informal sector. 
This is reflected in the labour markets of these economies by a formidable reservoir of 
workers employed in the ‘informal sector’. The term ‘informal sector’ came into wide 
usage during the last two decades. Before that informal sector was considered as a 
transitory phenomenon, which was expected to fade away as the formal sector of the 
economy created more and more jobs. Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis(1964), Harris- 
Todaro (1970) have used the concept of ‘surplus labour’ and have explained how this will 
facilitate the transition of the economies from agriculture to industry or from rural to 
urban in different ways. All these theories have expected that the informal sector would 
wither away with the passage of time. 
                  
                   However, economic recession, structural adjustment policies, continued high 
rate of urbanization, technical advancement and population growth in the developing 
economies, have forced the modern sector enterprises to retrench workers drastically. 
These workers have been absorbed by the informal sector of the economy alone, which 
has led to an unusual expansion of the informal sector in the developing economies. 
Therefore it is to be believed that in many years to come, informal sector will be an 
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expanding part of developing economies and this belief has forced the researchers and 
policy makers to recognize the importance of informal sector in developing economies. 
 
                 The term ‘informal sector’ has been defined in the literature in various ways. 
Mention may be made of the pioneer work by Hart (1973), who has defined the term 
‘informal sector’ to explain a dichotomy in the context of a dual model for urban workers 
in Ghana. An alternative definition of the informal sector has also been provided by 
International Labor Organization (ILO) in the early 1970s. According to ILO there is no 
precise definition of informal sector, rather it has some common characteristics like easy 
entry for the new enterprises, small-scale of operation, family ownership, reliance on 
indigenous resources, labour intensive and adaptive technology, skills acquired outside 
the formal system and operation in unregulated and competitive markets. The informal 
sector in a regulatory framework has been studied by De Soto (1989). In this approach 
the legal status is the main element which distinguishes informal from formal activities. 
Papola (1981) has suggested that the distinction between the formal and informal sector 
enterprises can be made on the basis of mode of production, organization, scale of 
operation, technology, productivity and labour markets. 
 
                   At the empirical level the role of informal sector in developing economies 
have been studied by Papola (1981), Romatet (1983), Das (2000), Banerjee (1985), Fields 
(1990), Cole and Sanders (1985), Agenor (1996), etc. Papola (1981) has discussed in 
general the various features of an urban informal sector in a developing economy and has 
considered the urban informal sector of the city of Ahmedabad in India as a case study. 
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Similarly Romatet (1983) has selected some areas of the city of Calcutta in order to study 
the features as well as the problems faced by the informal sectors of a developing 
economy. Das (2000) has tried to study the types of employment existing in the informal 
sector of a developing economy and has tried to analyze the contribution of informal 
sectors to the developing economy, by providing employment and income to the migrant 
laboures. Agenor (1996) on the basis of his empirical findings has estimated that more 
than 50 to 60 percent of labour force of the developing economies usually operates in the 
non-unionized sectors and often under flexible wage conditions.   
 
                On the basis of these empirical findings, a large number of theoretical works 
have been developed to provide suitable theoretical structures to examine the role of 
informal sectors in developing economies from different angles. The theoretical literature 
again consists of both the competitive general equilibrium framework and the partial 
equilibrium framework with imperfection in the market structure. But, here we would 
only focus on the studies based on competitive general equilibrium framework. Important 
works in this line are done by Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1993, 1997a, 1997c), 
Beladi and Yabuchi (2001), Gupta and Basu (2004), Chaudhuri (2000, 2003), Chaudhuri 
and Mukhopadhyay (2002) etc.  
            
                The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of liberalization, in the form 
of an increase in foreign capital inflow (or foreign direct investment), on the level of 
informal competitive wage rate as well as on the size of the informal segment of the 
economy. In the present structure an attempt has also been made to analyze the effects on 
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the levels of inequality as well as social welfare for a drive towards liberalization. The 
effect on welfare has been examined using Sen (1974) type social welfare function which 
links Gini measure of inequality and social welfare. The motivation behind the present 
study generates from the fact that with growing importance of informal sectors in the 
developing economies, it is necessary to examine the impact of liberalization policies on 
the size of these sectors. It is also important to analyze the impact of economic reform 
policies on the standard of living of the workers engaged in the informal sectors in the 
present era when the importance of informal sector is rising over time in the developing 
economies. As the standard of living of workers and wage earnings are positively 
correlated, the wage rate earned by the informal workers has been considered here as a 
proxy for their living standard. The vast existing literature has not addressed this issue 
adequately.  Some exceptional works done in this line are by Kar and Marjit (2001), 
Marjit and Beladi (2002), Marjit and Kar (2004), Marjit (2003), Marjit, Kar and Parkar 
(2004), Marjit and Maiti (2005), Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2006), Marjit, Kar and 
Acharyya(2007) , Marjit, Kar and Beladi(2007), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2010)  
Marjit and Kar(2011) etc. Apart from this the attempt to capture inequality and welfare 
by using a welfare function, which takes into account of Gini measure of inequality, is 
something new in the context of informal sector. In the context of income inequality and 
welfare in general equilibrium the most important work is the paper by Gupta (1994), 
though Gupta (1994) has not considered income inequality and welfare in the context of 
the informal sector.1 By linking informal sector with income inequality and welfare our 
paper has tried to fill up the lacuna that exists in the literature as mentioned earlier. 
                                                 
1
 However, Gupta (1997b) is an exception. In this paper Gupta (1997b) has considered both income 
inequality and poverty in the context of informal sector, though he has not considered the welfare measure 
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                 In the present paper a three-sector full employment model has been 
considered.2 It has been assumed here that there are two informal sectors in the economy-
the intermediate good producing informal manufacturing sector and the other is the 
agricultural sector. The intermediate good producing informal manufacturing sector 
(sector‘ z ’) is assumed to produce a ‘relatively low-skilled’ manufactured product which 
is used by the formal manufacturing sector of the economy (sector ‘ y ’) as a factor in 
fixed proportion. In short, sector ‘ z ’ produces a non-traded intermediate product, for 
sector ‘ y ’, i.e. the formal manufacturing sector 3, using fixed amounts of labour, formal 
capital and informal capital. The other informal sector in the economy, i.e. the 
agricultural (sector ‘ x ’), produces a traditional agricultural product with labour and 
informal capital. The formal manufacturing sector of the economy, sector ‘ y ’, is 
assumed to produce its product using labour, capital and the intermediate product which 
is produced in sector ‘ z ’. The products of sector ‘ x ’ and sector ‘ y ’ are assumed to be 
traded final commodities. It is assumed here that the formal sector of the economy 
employs workers at a contractual unionized wage rate which is much higher than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Sen (1974) in the context of informal sector. The present paper has borrowed Sen’s(1974) welfare 
function from Gupta’s (1994) work. The fact that this paper is different from Gupta (1994) is already 
mentioned earlier. We would also like to point out in this context that Gupta’s (1997) work has focused on 
Gini measure of inequality in the context of poverty by taking into account of informal sector in a Harris-
Todaro(1970) framework. The present paper is widely different from Gupta’s (1997b) model in two major 
ways. First, our paper has not considered a Harris-Todaro(1970) framework. Second the equational 
specifications of the model are also different from Gupta (1997b). Third, unlike Gupta (1997b), we have 
taken into account Sen(1974) type welfare function. 
2
 This paper has been built in line with the work done by Mitra (2010), though there are lots of differences 
between the present paper and Mitra (2010). First the modelling of the informal sector is different from the 
modelling of the informal sector that we find in Mitra (2010). Moreover, the present paper deals with 
inequality and welfare which are totally missing in Mitra (2010). 
3
 This assumption is quite realistic for developing countries where local outsourcing is a very common 
practice. Many big industries, MNCs etc. outsource some stages of their production processes to local 
informal industries. See Gupta and Basu (2004). 
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market determined competitive wage rate that is received by the workers engaged in the 
two informal sectors. Again in this model total formal capital stock consists of both 
domestic capital and foreign capital and they are assumed to be perfect substitutes. 4 
 
                      This paper attempts to show that trade liberalization, in the form of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), raises the level of wage rate of the informal workers and hence 
improves their standard of living. Moreover it wants to examine whether FDI creates a 
polarization in the economy. Finally the paper attempts to examine the impact of FDI on 
income inequality and social welfare. It would be interesting if one can find out the 
conditions in a developing economy under which FDI can reduce income inequality and 
improve welfare. The present paper can be considered as a first attempt in this regard. 
                      
             The paper is organized in the following manner. The model is described in 
Section 2. Section 3 deals with some comparative static results related to the impact of 
FDI on the level of informal competitive wage rate as well as on the welfare level of the 
economy. Finally, the concluding remarks are made in Section 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2. The Model:     
                A small open economy has been considered here which is basically classified 
into three sectors - the agricultural (rural) sector ‘ x ’, the formal manufacturing (urban) 
sector ‘ y ’ and the informal manufacturing (urban) sector ‘ z ’. The formal manufacturing 
sector and the agricultural sector produce final products but the informal manufacturing 
                                                 
4
 This is a standard assumption that is borrowed from the literature. See for example the works by Chandra 
and Khan (1993), Gupta(1997a),Chaudhuri (2003),Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay(2002,2010) etc. 
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sector produces an intermediate good for the formal manufacturing sector ‘ y ’. Following 
the assumptions regarding the ‘informal labour’, the agricultural sector and the informal 
manufacturing sector constitute the informal segment of the economy. The agricultural 
sector ‘ x ’ uses informal capital and labour whereas the informal manufacturing sector 
‘ z ’ uses fixed amount of formal capital with labour and informal capital 5 to produce 
their products.6 The fact that the informal manufacturing sector uses both formal capital 
and informal capital follows from the fact that the formal sector for its survival helps 
some segments of the informal manufacturing sector by providing limited amount of 
formal capital, though the latter sectors are mainly dependent on informal capital. The 
formal manufacturing sector ‘ y ’, apart from capital and labour, uses the product of 
informal manufacturing sector as an intermediate input to produce its product. Therefore, 
in this model informal capital is mobile between the two informal sectors of the 
economy, i.e. sectors ‘ x ’ and ‘ z ’. On the other hand formal capital is mobile between 
sectors ‘ y ’ and ‘ z ’. In this model total formal capital consist of both domestic capital 
and foreign capital.7 Finally labour is considered to be mobile among all the three sectors 
in the economy.  
 
                     It is assumed here that in the formal sector of the economy (sector ‘ y ’), 
there exists effective wage legislation and unionization of labour, due to which the wage 
rate of the workers of this sector, w , is given exogenously. The workers engaged in the 
                                                 
5
 One may also consider land instead of informal capital which is mobile between the two informal sectors 
‘ x ’ and ‘ z ’.The results of the model will remain unchanged in that case. 
6
 Fixed coefficient type of production function for the informal manufacturing sector is nothing but a 
simplifying assumption. 
7
 Out of the total formal capital the informal manufacturing sector uses only a limited amount of domestic 
capital. 
 9
informal segment of the economy (sector ‘ x ’ and sector ‘ z ’) receive market determined 
wage rate, w , which is much lower than the unionized wage rate of the formal sector. 
 
                  Due to the small open economy assumption, prices of the final goods 
producing sectors (sector ‘ x ’ and sector ‘ y ’) are internationally given. As the product of 
sector ‘ z ’ is fully utilized as an intermediate product by sector ‘ y ’, it is internationally 
non- traded and its price is determined within the economy. Sector ‘ y ’ uses the product 
of sector ‘ z ’on the basis of a fixed input-output ratio8; moreover, unit requirement of 
informal capital in sector ‘ z ’ is assumed to be constant. For all the other inputs used by 
various sectors we have a variable- coefficient type of technology. The input-output 
ratios can be expressed as functions of factor prices. Production function in each sector 
exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) with diminishing marginal productivity to each 
variable input.  
 
The following notations are used to describe the equational structure of the model. 
w  = fixed formal wage rate 
w = market determined informal wage rate 
Tr = return on informal capital 
r  = return to capital 
X = output of the agricultural sector, ‘ x ’. 
Y = output of the formal manufacturing sector, ‘ y ’. 
Z = output of the informal intermediate good producing sector, ‘z’.  
                                                 
8
 It implies that the input output coefficient zya is fixed. See Gupta and Basu (2004). 
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jP = price of the j th  sector, where j = x , y , z  
T = total supply of informal capital stock 
L = total labour force 
K = aggregate formal capital stock of the economy (both domestic and foreign). 
ija = quantity of  i
th
 input required to produce one unit of output of the  j th  sector,   
where i =T , L  , K  , Z ;  j = x , y , z  
ijθ  = distributive share of i th  input in the j th sector, where    i =T , L , K , Z ; j = x , y , z  
ijλ  = proportion of i th  input used in sector j , where i =T , L  , K  , Z ;  j = x , y , z  
jσ  = elasticity of substitution between factors in the j th sector, where j = x , y , z  
^    = proportionate change.  
The competitive equilibrium conditions are given by the following three equations: 
                                 P X  = TTXLX rawa +                                                                           (1) 
                                 P Y  = ZZYKYLY Parawa ++                                                             (2) 
                                 ZP  = TTZKZLZ rarawa ++                                                                  (3)                                                           
Full-employment conditions are given by the following equations: 
                                 LZaYaXa LZLYLX =++                                                                 (4) 
FDKZKY KKKZaYa +==+                                                            (5) 
TZaXa TZTX =+                                                                              (6) 
ZYaZY =                                                                                          (7) 
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In this model there are 7 endogenous variables like w , Tr , r , ZP , X ,Y , Z which are to be 
solved from 7 equations. Thus the system is determinable.                      
Here equations (1), (2) and (3) constitute the price system and the rest of the equations 
form the output system. It may be noted here that the system does not satisfy the 
decomposable property since the four unknown input prices, w , Tr , r  and ZP , cannot be 
determined from the price system alone.  
 
                   The working of the model is simple. Let us start from any arbitrary value 
of ZP . For any arbitrary value of ZP  and given YP  , r  can be solved from equation (2) in 
terms of ZP . Given XP , w  can be determined in terms of Tr  from equation (1). Then from 
equation (3), Tr can be expressed in terms of ZP . Once factor prices are determined the 
input-output coefficients can also be determined in terms of ZP . Next, using equation (6) 
and by solving equations (4) and (5) simultaneously, Y and Z can be determined in terms 
of ZP . Finally equilibrium value of ZP  can be determined from equation (7). 
 
                     The model can be analyzed in the following manner: From equations (1) and 
(2) we find that w  = w ( Tr ) and r = r ( ZP ) respectively, where 0<∂
∂
Tr
w
and 0<
∂
∂
ZP
r
, 
given the international prices of the traded final commodities and the formal sector wage 
rate. Now putting w  = w  ( Tr ) and r = r ( ZP ) in equation (3) we can obtain Tr as a 
function ZP i.e. Tr = Tr  ( ZP ). It is assumed here that r and Tr moves in the same direction 
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in the economy.9This assumption is realistic but is crucial for our model. Therefore, we 
get 0<
∂
∂
Z
T
P
r
. Finally we get that w  = w ( ){ }ZT Pr  = w ( ZP ) where 0>∂
∂
ZP
w
 . In this way 
we can express each factor prices as a function of ZP  and thus we have boiled down all 
the variable input-output coefficients as a function of ZP  alone. 
Now from equation (6) we can derive the value of X in terms of Z and ZP , given the total 
informal capital supply, T , in the economy, as 
                    X  = )( ZTX
TZ
Pa
ZaT −
                                                                                           (6.1) 
Using equations (6.1) and (7) we can rewrite equation (4) as, 
 
( ) ( ) YaPaYPaPa
ZaTPa ZYZLZZLY
ZTX
TZ
ZLX )()( ++





−
= L                                                (4.1) 
Equation (4.1) may be interpreted as the locus of all such combinations of ZP  and Y so 
that the labour market is in equilibrium. 
Differentiating equation (4.1) we get, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )




−+
′+′+−
′
−
′
−=
ZTX
ZLX
TZ
ZLZ
ZYTZZLY
ZYZLZZLYZYTZ
TTX
ZLXZTXZTXZLX
LLZ
Pa
Pa
a
Pa
aaPa
YaPaPaYaaT
ra
PaPaPaPa
dP
dY
)(
)()()(2
 > 0                                                        
                                                                                                                                           (8)                                                                    
where )( ZLX Pa′ < 0, )( ZTX Pa′ > 0, )( ZLY Pa′ < 0, )( ZLZ Pa′ < 0 and ( )YaaT ZYTZ− = XaTX > 0.                                       
         
                                                 
9
 It is empirically observed in any developing economy. Both formal and informal interest rates (also 
interpreted as rates of return of formal and informal capital) move in the same direction. 
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Equation (4.1) is shown as the LL locus in figure 1 which is a positively sloped curve. 
Proceeding in the same way, equation (5) can be written as, 
KYaPaYPa ZYZKZZKY =+ )()(                                                                                        (5.1) 
Equation (5.1) can be interpreted as locus of all such combinations of ZP  and Y so that 
the formal capital market is in equilibrium. 
Differentiating equation (5.1) we get, 
( )
( )ZYZKZZKY
ZYZKZZKY
KKZ aPaPa
YaPaPa
dP
dY
)()(
)()(
+
′+′
−=  < 0                                                                       (9) 
where )( ZKY Pa′  > 0 and )( ZKZ Pa′ > 0. 
Equation (5.1) is depicted in figure 1 as KK locus which is a negatively sloped curve. 
 
 
                                        Figure 1 
 
K  
K  
L
L
                                 
              Y  
      ZP  
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                          The intersection of LL locus and KK locus in figure 1 gives us the 
equilibrium values of ZP  and Y. Once ZP  is known, all other factor prices, ( w , Tr  and r ) 
are also known. Thus the input-output ratios are known. Finally, when input-output ratios 
and Y are known, Z and X can be determined from equations (7) and (6) respectively.  
 
3. Drive towards Liberalization: 
3.1. FDI and Informal Wage 
                      In this section the impact of liberalization on the level of market determined 
competitive wage rate (informal wage) which is received by the workers engaged in the 
informal segment of the economy and also on the size of the informal sectors has been 
considered. In this model the drive towards liberalization is examined through FDI which 
has been captured in terms of an inflow of foreign capital in the economy. An inflow of 
foreign capital causes a change in output levels and also a change in the factor prices in 
our model. 
                    
                      In figure 1 we find that FDI, in the form of an inflow of foreign capital, 
leads to an increase in the formal capital endowment of the economy. This shifts the 
KK locus upward. However, there will be no movement of the LL locus as a result of 
FDI. Hence a new equilibrium has been obtained at the intersection of the new KK  locus 
and the LL locus, where both Y and ZP  are above than their previous equilibrium levels. 
This is shown in figure 2. 
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                                        Figure 2 
 
 
From the above diagram we find that due to FDI the size of the formal manufacturing 
sector ‘ y ’, expands which implies, from equation (7), also an expansion of the informal  
intermediate good producing sector ‘ z ’. Therefore, given the informal capital and labour 
endowments of the economy, sector ‘ x ’ must contract. Again we find that for an increase 
in the supply of foreign capital, price of the intermediate good increases.  Next we have 
to examine the impact on the factor prices. In this model w and ZP  are positively related 
whereas both r and Tr are inversely related with ZP . Thus with a rise in ZP  due to FDI we 
find that w  rises whereas both r and Tr fall. In other words, the competitive wage rate of 
the workers in the informal sector, w  , increases whereas rate of return or rate of interest 
on informal capital, Tr , and rate of return or rate of interest on formal capital, r , 
decreases due to FDI.  
K
K
L      
 
L      
 
1K  
1K  
                                 
               Y  
     ZP  
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                          These results may be interpreted in economic terms in the following 
manner. From our equational structure of the model we find that equation (5) (or more 
specifically equation (5.1)) along with equation (7) implies both the direct and the 
indirect requirement of FDI by the formal manufacturing sector in the economy. So for 
given price of the informal intermediate product, an increase in the level of foreign 
capital inflow or FDI raises the output of the formal manufacturing sector. Again, as the 
formal manufacturing sector is dependent on the intermediate informal sector an 
expansion of the former leads to an automatic expansion of the latter. This is explained in 
terms of equation (7). Therefore, both sectors ‘ y ’ and ‘ z ’ expand. Now for expansion of 
the two sectors, ‘ y ’ and ‘ z ’, more labour and informal capital (for sector ‘ z ’ only) are 
required 10 which is met from sector ‘ x ’ and consequently sector ‘ x ’, the agricultural 
sector, contracts, given the labour and informal capital endowments in the economy. 
Therefore, it is found here that FDI leads to an expansion of the intermediate good 
producing informal manufacturing sector along with the expansion of the formal 
manufactuing sector and a contraction of the agricultural good producing informal sector 
in the economy. Consequently, there is a tendency for higher allocation of labour force to 
the formal and informal manufacturing sector (usually the urban sector of the economy) 
and fewer workers are available for the (rural) agricultural sector in the economy. Hence 
FDI creates a situation of polarization in the economy. 
  
                                                 
10
 In fact more informal capital required by sector ‘ z ’ implies more informal capital is required indirectly 
by sector ‘ y ’ as these two sectors are interdependent on each other. 
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                           We have considered the above movements for a given price of the 
product of the intermediate manufacturing sector. With the increase in the demand for the 
product of informal manufacturing sector by the formal manufacturing sector as a result 
of FDI, the price of the former product i.e. ZP  increases. Again, FDI results in an increase 
in the total capital endowment of the economy as a whole. This creates a downward 
pressure on the rate of return of capital, r , in the economy. It is assumed that the rates on 
return on both informal capital and formal capital move in the same direction. So, when 
r  falls, Tr  also falls. With the increase in ZP and fall in both r and Tr , we find from 
equation (3) that to maintain the zero profitability condition in the informal non-traded 
intermediate sector, the informal competitive wage rate, w , must increase. Finally, with a 
rise in w and fall in r , the zero profitability condition in the agricultural sector is also 
maintained. Therefore, it is found here that due to FDI the wage rate ( w ) received by the 
informal workers increases leading to an improvement in their standard of living as the 
wage rate earned by the informal workers has been considered in this model as a proxy 
for their living standard.  
The above results can be summarized in the form of following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:- Trade liberalization in the form of FDI in a small open economy raises 
the informal wage rate and consequently the standard of living of the informal workers in 
the economy. Along with this such an FDI creates a polarization in the economy. 
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3.2. FDI, Inequality and Welfare: 
                          We now consider the impact of FDI on inequality and welfare when the 
foreign capital income is fully repatriated. Following Gupta (1994a) and also Gupta and 
Gupta (2010) it is assumed in this paper that there exists two income groups among the 
working class in the society: (i) the formal sector workers who earn the wage rate, w  and 
(ii) the informal sector workers who earn the competitive wage rate, w . It is also assumed 
here that the workers are the owners of all types of capital stock (i.e. both informal and 
formal capital) and there is perfect equality in the distribution of capital stock.11  This 
assumption is crucial for this part of our model. To examine the welfare effects in this 
model the labour endowment has been normalized to unity. The rental return from formal 
capital per worker can be treated as formal interest income. So total income of a 
particular worker(and also of the working class as labour endowment is normalized to 
unity) is his wage income plus formal interest income plus informal interest income. 
There is thus no difference between wage gap and the income gap. The following table 
summarizes the income distribution of the workers: 
Income DT rKTrw ++ .  DT rKTrw ++ .  
Frequency 
yL  xL + zL  
Here ,, YaLXaL LYYLXX ==  and ZaL LZZ :=  implying the levels of employment in 
sectors ‘ x ’, ‘ y ’ and ‘ z ’ respectively. 
 
                                                 
11
 According to Gupta (1994a), the total population is actually treated as identical to total labour 
endowment so that it is classified into various types of working classes and there is no room for capital 
owners in the total population. So unless one considers workers are the owners of domestic capital stock it 
is not possible to show inequality in income distribution for the economy as a whole. 
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                         The welfare measure of Sen (1974), defined as the per-capita income 
multiplied by one minus the Gini-coefficient of income distribution, is an appropriate 
measure of the welfare of the workers. Thus we can write Sen (1974) type social welfare 
function as follows: 
( )G−=Ω 1ξ                                                                                                                    (15) 
where Ω  = welfare measure, ξ = per-capita income12 and G = Gini-coefficient of income 
distribution. In this model 
( ) ji ppwwG −=ξ                                                                                                            (16) 
 where ji pp , = relative frequencies of  the income levels ( w DT rKTr ++ . ) and 
( w DT rKTr ++ . ) respectively.13 
If we normalize the total labour endowment of the economy to 1 then we get, 
ip = YL  and jp = ( )ZX LL + ,  
Therefore, equation (16) can be written as, 
       ( ) ( )ZXy LLLwwG +−=ξ                                                                                     (16.1) 
 
From the above equation we get,             
                                                 
12
 Here per capita income is same as national income as total labour endowment is normalized to unity. 
13
 The Gini-coefficient in general is given by ji
N
i
N
i
ji xxffNG −= ∑∑
= =1 1
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1
µ
, where µ  is the mean. 
One can write it as ∑∑
= =
−=
N
i
N
j
jiji xxppG
1 12
1µ , where ip = N
f i
 and jp = N
f j
are the relative 
frequencies. Division by 2 on the RHS implies that one part of the departure of the Lorenz curve from the 
egalitarian line has been considered. But when we write ∑∑
= =
−=
N
i
N
j
jiji xxppG
1 1
µ  the overall measure 
of inequality has been considered. Thus when N=1, jiji xxppG −=µ . Here µ = ξ , ix = 
DT rKTrw ++ . and jx = DT rKTrw ++ . , ip = XL , jp = ( )ZX LL + . 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 


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



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+
+
+
++
−
+
+
−=+ Z
ZX
Z
X
ZX
X
YZX
YZXY L
LL
LL
LL
LLLL
Gy
Lww
w
Gy
LLwLG ˆˆˆˆˆˆξ
  (16.2) 
Here ( ),ˆˆˆ XaL LXX += ( )YaL LYY ˆˆˆ +=  and   ( )ZaL LZZ ˆˆˆ += = Zˆ  as LZa is fixed 
 
                            Now, due to FDI w  rises and Lja s fall. We also know that such an FDI 
causes X  to contract and both Y and Z to expand. Therefore, XL falls, but the directions 
of the movements of YL and ZL are ambiguous. Hence the effect of FDI on the measure 
on inequality is somewhat indeterminate. However, it may be inferred that, if there is a 
reduction in the level of YL and there is an increase in the level of ZL (which is actually 
true as Z increases) so that the rate of reduction in the employment level of the formal 
sector (i.e. sector ‘ y ’) is greater than that of the weighted average of the expansion in 
aggregate employment level in the informal sectors (i.e. both sectors ‘ x ’ and ‘ z ’)14 then 
we get a reduction in the value of the RHS of equation (16.2).15  
 
                            Next we consider the national income as well as per-capita income of 
the economy (when total labour endowment of the economy has been normalized to 1) 
with full repatriation of foreign capital income as follows: 
( ) DTY rKTrwLLww +++−=ξ                                                                                   (17) 
                                                 
14
 It is to be noted that, given the labour endowment of the economy, if the formal employment level falls 
then the level of informal employment must rise.  
15
 It is quite realistic to assume that the urban formal manufacturing (the production process of which is 
capital-intensive in nature) sector of a developing country sheds off labour drastically in response to a rise 
w; whereas the intermediate informal sector of the economy (which is comparatively labour-intensive 
sector), cannot reduce its unit labour requirement to a large extent due to a rise in w. Therefore, with the 
expansion of the output levels of both the formal and the informal manufacturing sectors, it can be said that 
employment level of workers in the formal sector falls whereas that in the informal sector rises. 
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From the above equation we get, 
( ) ( )
r
rK
r
Tr
w
LLwLLww DTTZXYY ˆˆˆˆˆ ξξξξξ ++
+
+
−
=                                                    (17.1) 
Here =+=<<> YaLrrw LYYT ˆˆˆ,0ˆ,0ˆ,0ˆ ambiguous as LYaˆ < 0 and Yˆ > 0. 
                         Here the effect on per-capita income is also ambiguous. However, we can 
search for some sufficient conditions to get unambiguous results. For this we need to 
interpret each term of equation (17.1).The first term of the RHS of equation (17.1) 
implies the combination of wage differential effect along with the employment effect of 
sector ‘ y ’. We call it the labour reallocation effect. If this employment effect is assumed 
to be negative (as assumed earlier) the first term on the RHS, i.e. labour reallocation 
effect, will be negative. The second term of the above equation is positive wage income 
effect on ξ  as the competitive wage rate, w , increases due to FDI. The third and the 
fourth terms of the RHS of equation (17.1) imply that decrease in the returns from both 
types of capital (i.e. informal and formal capital) put negative impact on the per-capita 
income of the economy. We refer to them together as the capital income effect. However, 
if we assume that the wage income effect of the economy dominates over the sum of 
labour reallocation effect and the capital income effect, then we get the result that per-
capita income of the economy increases due to FDI.16 
 
                        Now, if ξ increases due to foreign capital inflow, then to maintain the 
equality condition of equation (16.2), G must fall which implies decrease in inequality of 
                                                 
16
 One very common characteristic of any developing country is scarcity of capital and stock of labour 
endowment is quite large. 
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income. Finally, an increase in ξ  and a fall in G implies an increase in Ω , as we find 
from equation (15).  We summarize our result in the form of the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2:- If social welfare measure of Sen (1974), that incorporates the Gini-
coefficient of income distribution, is considered then FDI (with full repatriation of 
foreign capital income) may reduce income inequality and raise social welfare of a small 
open economy, under some reasonable conditions. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks: 
                 The present paper has examined the effects of a trade liberalization policy, in 
the form of FDI, on the level of wage earnings of the workers engaged in the informal 
sectors of a representative developing economy. We have considered here a three sector 
general equilibrium full employment model. It is assumed in this model that there exist 
two informal sectors and one formal sector in the developing economy. One of the two 
informal sectors is considered to produce a non-traded intermediate product which is used 
by the formal manufacturing sector of the economy. The intermediate product is 
produced using labour, informal capital and a negligible and fixed amount of formal 
capital. The other informal sector is considered to be a normal agricultural sector which 
requires labour along with informal capital to produce its product. The formal 
manufacturing sector of the economy requires labour, formal capital and a fixed amount 
of the intermediate product, produced by the informal manufacturing sector, in its 
production process. Here formal capital is assumed to be mobile between the formal and 
intermediate informal manufacturing sectors whereas labour is assumed to be mobile 
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between all the three sectors.  Informal capital, on the other hand is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile between the two informal sectors.  
 
                      In this scenario it is found that due to FDI the level of informal wage rate of 
the economy increases and hence it may be concluded that the standard of living of the 
workers engaged in the informal sector improves. It is also found in this paper that FDI 
expands the formal and informal intermediate–good producing manufacturing (urban) 
sectors whereas contracts the agricultural (rural) informal sector. Thus FDI creates a 
polarization in the economy not only with reference to the size of the urban and rural 
sectors but also with respect to their employment levels. Moreover, in this paper the 
effects on the levels of inequality of income distribution as well as social welfare due to 
FDI within the small open economy have also been discussed. For this purpose a Sen 
(1974) type welfare function has been considered.  It is found in this paper that due to 
FDI inequality may fall and social welfare may improve within the economy under 
certain conditions. Thus the paper can be considered as a new attempt to examine the 
welfare conditions of the people in a small open economy as a result of FDI along with 
income inequality and standard of living.  
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